Abstract: Tests for "effective" compliance programs take the form of lists specifying required elements in varying level of detail. From an economic perspective, an effective compliance program can be defined more fundamentally as the set of policies and procedures that a rational, profit-maximizing firm would establish if it faced an expected sanction equal to the social cost of violations. This paper explores the idea and several of its extensions and qualifications.
Introduction
Many regulatory systems demand that organizations implement compliance programseither as a direct regulatory requirement, or as a cost-effective means for avoiding or mitigating penalties for violations. To receive regulatory credit, such programs must be "effective" -meaning, generally, that they must be reasonably designed and vigorously administered so as to deter and sanction violations of applicable norms. This article explores the economic meaning of "effective" compliance programs.
I. Effective Compliance Programs
Internal compliance programs are a key weapon in the arsenal of weapons that the government deploys against violations of regulatory norms Such programs are mandated under a number of statutes and regulations including the Bank Secrecy Act's anti-money laundering rules, 2 the Dodd-Frank Act's rules on swap dealers and futures commission merchants, 3 SEC lawsuits 11 and class action litigation. 12 Even when not legally required to do so, moreover, companies adopt compliance programs in order to enhance the chances that enforcement officials will refrain from charging suspected violations 13 or will impose a lower sanction for violations that are established.
14 Merely adopting a compliance policy is insufficient; it is necessary also that the policy be reasonably designed and faithfully implemented within the organization. 15 But when is a compliance program "effective" in this sense? Government agencies provide guidance on this question in the form of lists of factors or required elements. A description of several leading formulations follows:
1. In one of the earliest such lists, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 sets out the following "minimum" requirements for an effective anti-money laundering program: (1) Self-Disclosure Protocol (2013) , available at https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-info/files/Provider-Self-Disclosure-Protocol.pdf. 15 The Department of Justice's Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations express the idea by admonishing prosecutors to "determine whether a corporation's compliance program is merely a 'paper program' or whether it was designed, implemented, reviewed, and revised, as appropriate, in an effective manner." U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-28.800.
of internal policies, procedures, and controls; (2) the designation of a compliance officer; (3) an ongoing employee training program; and (4) an independent audit function to test programs.
16
These four elements -internal controls, an internal compliance function, employee training, and independent validation -are sometimes referred to as the "four pillars" of AML compliance.
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These requirements are found in nearly all official formulations of effective compliance promulgated in later years. prosecutors may consider whether the compliance program is "designed to detect the particular types of misconduct most likely to occur in a particular corporation's line of business." Act" recognizes that there no "one-size-fits-all" effective program, 25 but goes on to list the following elements as emblematic: (1) willingness to assure continuing compliance; and the adequacy of operating systems, including internal procedures, controls, and audit activities, designed to ensure compliance on a routine and consistent basis. To receive the highest rating, a bank must convince the regulators that (1) management is capable of and staff is sufficient for effectuating compliance; (2) an effective compliance program, including an efficient system of internal procedures and controls, has been established; (3) changes in consumer statutes and regulations are promptly reflected in the institution's policies, procedures, and compliance training; (4) the institution provides adequate training for its employees; (5) if any violations are noted, they are minor and easily corrected; (6) there is no evidence of discriminatory acts or practices, reimbursable violations, or practices resulting in repeat violations; and (7) violations and deficiencies are promptly corrected.
37
As these and other statements demonstrate, there is no universally accepted definition of an effective compliance program, even though there is substantial overlap among the examples.
We can observe also a certain evolution of thinking towards increasing complexity (from the four requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act to the considerably more elaborate recent Justice Department statement) and inclusion of different factors (note the focus in the Justice Department statement on assignment of responsibility, risk assessment, and attention to business partners and agents). The lack of uniform standards may not be problematic for those working in a particular field, where the governing standard is the only one that really matters. But the profusion and complexity of pronouncements, important and useful as they are, does suggest that current thinking has not penetrated to the core of the issue. The following section investigates whether economic analysis can offer insights on this question.
II. A Simple Economic Analysis of Compliance
Assume that employees in a rational, profit-maximizing, risk-neutral firm engage in random illegal on-the-job conduct. The government imposes a fine on the firm for proven violations, which is administered with probability . The firm experiences a sanction for violations. For the moment, assume that the government's enforcement efforts are costless.
The firm spends an amount on activities such as setting an appropriate "tone at the top," screening employees, conducting training programs, maintaining mechanisms for confidential reporting of misconduct, operating surveillance and reporting procedures, sanctioning employees for violations, and so on. As a result of these activities the firm avoids the sanction pf with probability z. The probability z increases with the firm's compliance spend, but at a decreasing rate: '( ) > 0, z" ) < 0.
With compliance, the firm's cost of violations is:
1 The firm will engage in compliance if the cost of sanctions with compliance is less than or equal to the cost of sanctions without compliance:
1 This is equivalent to the proposition that the firm will spend on compliance if the cost of compliance is less than or equal to the cost of sanctions avoided:
As shown in Figure 1 , the firm will expend resources up to the point 1 where the marginal cost of compliance equals the marginal cost of sanctions avoided: 
Let us now consider the impact of different values of p and f. Many combinations of p
and f can generate the optimal expected fine . The particular values of p and f are not of concern if we assume that enforcement is costless and firms are risk-neutral. But these considerations matter when we relax these assumptions.
If firms are risk-averse, they will experience a low-probability/high-fine regime as more costly than a high probability/low fine regime because the former is riskier. Accordingly, riskaverse firms will expend more resources on compliance when fines are high and the probability of detection is low than when fines are low and the probability of detection is high.
probability of detection is low and fines are high than they do when the probability of detection is high and fines are low. The reason is that it is usually more costly for the government to detect violations than to impose fines for violations once detected.
The optimal values for p and f minimizes the sum of the firm's compliance costs C and the government's enforcement cost E. These two costs tend to offset one another, but probably not completely. For low levels of p, it is probable that the government's cost savings in enforcement is more than offset by the firm's increased compliance spend. For high levels of p, likewise, it is probable that the firm's cost savings is more than offset by the government's enhanced enforcement spend.
This suggests that the social optimum is an intermediate level of enforcement and fine: Optimally, both the government and the private sector will be involved in compliance.
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The foregoing suggests an interesting footnote to the economic theory of punishment. As noted by Becker and others, government can conserve on resources by adopting a low 38 For example, firms have superior access to information and thus can detect violations at lower cost than the government, which must rely on formal legal processes; on the other hand, firms may have an incentive not to perform the compliance function vigorously because they may have to pay for violations discovered. Compliance programs may also lack the threat value of government investigations and therefore may sometimes be less effective at smoking out instances of misconduct.
probability of detection/high fine enforcement policy. 39 Conventionally, the limits on this strategy are conceived as flowing from the defendant's solvency constraint and the public's unwillingness to tolerate high punishments for minor offenses. The theory of compliance suggests another constraint. The government's choice between policy instruments not only affects the government's costs; it also affects the firm's compliance response. If the government spends lightly on enforcement and relies on high fines to deter misconduct, the firm increases compliance spending in order to reduce the risk of having to pay a substantial fine. The efficiencies claimed for low-detection high-fine enforcement strategies may be overstated unless the costs of compliance are taken into account.
We now consider situations in which the firm will not engage in optimal compliance expenditures. Consider the case where the expected sanction for violations is too small. In such a case, as shown in Figure 4 , the firm will spend too little on compliance: With an inefficiently low expected fine, the firm both engages in too many violations and institutes compliance expenditures of 1 .
Inefficiencies also result if the government imposes an expected sanction for violations larger than their social cost. As shown in Figure 5 , when the expected sanction is too large, the firm institutes compliance expenditures of 2 : The firm engages in too little of the activity which generates the risk of violations, and also spends too much rather than too little on compliance activities.
So far we have considered the situation where the government imposes a fine for violations. The compliance response, however, provides an additional policy tool. Even if a low sanction (or no sanction) is imposed for the underlying violation, the firm will behave optimally if it spends on compliance. Thus when fines are too low, the government may be able to achieve optimal behavior by mandating an effective compliance program.
This strategy confers advantages as compared with policing the underlying conduct. To incentivize the firm to adopt an effective compliance program, the government does not need to impose a fine equal to the social cost, but only a penalty of sufficient magnitude such that it is cheaper for the firm to institute an effective compliance program than not to do so. This lower penalty is likely to encounter reduced public resistance. Moreover, although the government must expend resources to supervising the compliance program, it is probably cheaper to mandate an effective compliance program than to police the underlying conduct. Unlike primary misconduct, which is usually hidden from view, large parts of the compliance program are easy to observe.
The option of mandating a compliance program thus holds promise for improving the cost-effectiveness of regulation. However, there is also a danger associated with this approach.
Governments have an incentive to require firms to overspend on compliance programs. The reason is that regulators do not pay the costs of the program, but obtain benefits by appearing "tough on crime" and by deflecting blame for violations. This situation is shown in Figure 6 :
The firm's optimal compliance expenditure is but the government requires 1. Even though 1 is socially inefficient, regulators may avoid criticism by observing that it reduces the rate of violations.
III. Applications
The definition of an effective compliance program suggested in this paper -the program that a rational profit-maximizing firm would adopt if faced with an expected fine equal to the social cost of violations -cannot easily be translated into concrete elements of actual programs.
It is couched at too abstract a level and requires assessment of costs that are difficult or impossible to quantify. As a practical matter, therefore, list-type criteria for effective compliance programs are necessary and appropriate. Nevertheless, the economic approach has the virtue of clarifying thinking. Beyond this, the economic approach does offer certain guides for interpretation in practical cases:
1. The fact that firms have an incentive to adopt compliance programs, even in the absence of government compulsion, suggests that the government could usefully examine the policies and procedures voluntarily adopted by firms as guidance for the elements of a government-mandate program. To be sure, the utility of examining private sector models is limited by two considerations. First, the pervasive influence of government mandates has made it nearly impossible to identify a pure private sector solution, since nearly all private sector compliance programs are adopted against the background of government requirements. Second, the reliability of private solutions must be assessed in light of the fact that companies facing regulatory requirements may face incentives to violate the law, so may not voluntarily adopt effective programs. These qualifications suggest caution, but do not nullify the value of examining private-sector models for effective compliance. In fact it is likely that the evolution of government thinking on the elements of an effective compliance program has been informed by an active dialog with the private compliance sector.
2. The government should not micro-manage the requirements for an effective program.
Since companies have different characteristics, history, and cultures, any attempt to specify the ingredients of an effective program at a granular level will likely generate poor results. No regulator or prosecutor can hope to know more about the internal workings of an organization than the existing managers who spend their professional lives there. Thus regulatory requirements for compliance programs, if articulated at a excessive level of detail, are doomed to be balky, inefficient, and insensitive to the particular circumstances and unique culture of any given organization. The better approach is for the government to identify key components and general principles and then allow the regulated entity to design the details.
3. Courts should generally defer to an agency's judgment about the effectiveness of an organization's compliance program. The agency will ordinarily be familiar with the policies underlying the laws being enforced, and often has knowledge of conditions in the industry and in the regulated firm. On the other hand, as noted above, governments face a temptation to demand more in compliance than is socially optimal. For this reason, even while exercising deference, a court should scrutinize the program in order to assure itself that it is not unreasonably designed and not administered in an irrational or unfair manner.
4. A final issue concerns the legal consequences that follow if a regulated entity commits a violation even though it has an effective compliance program in place. On the one hand, as demonstrated above, an effective program can achieve the socially optimal level of violations.
Moreover, recognition of an effective program as a defense reduces a firm's risk by providing a "safe harbor" against liability. These considerations might suggest that an effective compliance program should provide an absolute defense against liability.
Other considerations counsel against an affirmative defense. It is often hard to determine whether a compliance program is actually effective -either because it is difficult to assign values or weigh the impact of different components, or because the firm presents the program as effective when in fact it is not. This means that there is substantial room for error in the determination of an effective program. The fact that a violation occurred, while not establishing the ineffectiveness of the program, might nevertheless lead a reviewer to revise the assessment she might otherwise make: other things equal, it is more probable, given a violation, that the compliance program under review was ineffective. The possibility of error in the determination of whether a a program is effective suggests that an affirmative defense might not represent the best social policy.
In addition to the possibility of error, there are activity levels to consider. In the presence of an affirmative defense, a firm that has an effective compliance program in place will tend to engage in more of the activities that create a risk of compliance violations. The reason is that the firm gets a benefit from these activities but does not pay for violations that occur even with an effective program in place. In consequence, an affirmative defense for effective compliance programs may lead to inefficiently high activity levels and resultant harm to the public.
For these reasons, it appears most appropriate for the law to recognize the presence of an apparently effective compliance program as a substantial factor in mitigating the penalty or tipping the balance in favor of non-enforcement, but not as an absolute defense to liability.
Conclusion
This paper has offered simple economic description of an effective compliance program:
the set of policies and procedures that a rational, profit-maximizing firm would establish if it faced an expected sanction equal to the social cost of violations. Firms that operate effective programs minimize the net social costs of violations. In any given case, the firm's compliance expenditures will be a function of the government's enforcement strategy: if the government opts for a low-detection, high-fine approach, a risk-averse firm will expend more on compliance than if the government adopts a high-detection, low-fine strategy.
If the government can require firms to adopt effective compliance programs, the result will be efficient even if budget or political constraints prevent the government from imposing an optimal fine. But offsetting the government's cost saving here is the need to ensure that the firm does in fact operate an effective program. Courts should generally defer to the government's determination that a firm has or has not implemented an effective program; but the deference should be qualified by the fact that the government's incentives are not fully aligned with those of the public: governments face a temptation to impose compliance requirements that in some cases may reduce rather than increase social wealth.
Strong policy arguments can be developed both in favor of and against the creation of an affirmative defense for effective compliance programs. All things considered, it is probably preferable for the government not to provide an affirmative defense, but rather to give substantial credit for effective compliance programs in connection with matters such as charging, settlements, and sentencing.
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